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THE EMS TEN YEARS  ON 
Communication from the Commission to the Council EIPLAIIATOR.Y  IIKMOKARDUM 
The  Communication  is  intended  to  provide  the  opportunity  for 
an  exchange  of views  in the  Council  on  current  EMS  issues  on  the occasion 
of its tenth anniversary. THE EMS TEN YEARS ON 
Communication from the Commission to the Council 
1.  Introduction 
The European Monetary System (EMS) started functioning ten years ago on 13  March 
1979.  It  was  set  up  following  the  Resolution  of the  European  Council  on  the 
establishment of the EMS and related matters of 5 December in Drusscls and implemented 
by an agreement between the central banks of  the Community. The EMS has become the 
cornerstone upon which European monetary co-operation is  built.  Jt  has been successful 
in  promoting lower innation and more stable exchange rates,  thereby fostering healthy 
economic growth, which is an essential base for the Community's strategy to complete the 
large internal market by  1992. 
The ecu is  intimately linked to the EMS.  In the ecu's ten years of existence,  its private 
use in financial markets has grown fast  and, with its  increased  use in  European interna-
tional commercial transactions, it is  now maturing into a currency. 
2. Three phases of the  EMS 
The  EMS  is  not a  rigid  system.  It has evolved  over  the last  ten  years  in  the face  of 
changing  circumstances,  both within  and  outside  the  Community.  Its rules  have  been 
adapted and its procedures have been  implemented nexibly.  The credibility of the EMS 
is  based  on  an  underlying  policy  consensus.  This  too  has  developed  over  the years, 
strengthening  the  system  and  helping  it  to  function  more  smoothly.  It  is  possible  to 
distinguish three main phases <turing the system's ten years of existence. 
- I 979-1983. 
During  its  early  years,  the  EMS  functioned  against  a  difficult  background within  the 
Community.  Economic divergences were substantial: policy stances were still at variance; 
inflation was high and diiTerences hetween EMS countries large; current account perfor-
mances  were  varied;  budget  deficits  were  frequently  sizeable  and  sometimes  partially 
financed by monetary means.  Externally, the dollar was strengthening. After the experience of the 1970s, a learning process on the part of EMS participants was 
necessary.  Realignments were frequent at the beginning, but gradtwtly their aim moved 
from that of accommodating inflation differentials towards reducing inflation. This meant 
that  realignments  came  more  and  more  to  he  accompanied  hy  domestic  adjustment 
measures.  In contrast to  the  1970s,  economic divergences  were  becoming increasingly 
matters for domestic policy adjustment. 
During this period also, the financial  use of the ecu hy  the private sector was beginning 
to expand rapidly.  Its property as a  ready-made vehicle for  currency diversification gave 
both investors and borrowers perceived advantages in  using the ecu.  An active interbank 
market for  ecu credits and deposits  was  growing.  J  lowever the ecu was still not treated 
as foreign currency in all  Member States. 
- 1984-1987. 
By  now the EMS policy consensus, which recogni7.es  no trade-off between inflation and 
growth,  was  being  translated  gradually  into  more  convergent  economic  performances 
within the Community.  Inflation was being steadily brought down with the help of  falling 
commodity prices.  DiiTetentials in  cost and price inflation narrowed considerably.  The 
process  of liberalising  capital  movements  had  restarted  and  was  making  significant 
progress.  However, the international monetary background was very turbulent.  The -dol-
tar  first  rose,  then fell  sharply from  its  February  1985  peak.  Financial innovation and 
globalization  was  continuing  apace,  adding  to  the  dangers  from  speculative  capital 
movements.  In  spite  o( the  disorderly  external  environment,  only  two  general  EMS 
realignments took place, one in  April  1986 and another in January  1987,  each involving 
smaller changes than its predecessor. 
During 1985, a first set of  changes to the EMS rules was agreed.  It was designed to aHow 
the  role  of the official  ecu  to  grow hy  improving its  usability  through a  mobilization 
mechanism.  Although the changes were modest,  they  marked  the  willingness  of EMS 
participants  to  improve  its  mechanisms  and  procedures.  By  the  end  of the  period, 
agreement was emerging to end  all  restrictions  on capital movements, in  a  majority of 
Member States before 1992, but not at the expense of EMS stability.  This factor and the 
January 1987 realignment, caused by tensions exacerbated by external factors, gave the 
impetus towards a second, more substantial package to strengthen the EMS. 
The so-called "Baslc(Nyborg" agreement of  September 1987 provided for a more balanced 
implementation of the exchange rate commitment, while leaving  the  fundamental  rules 
2 and objectives  of the system unaltered.  Measures were  adopted to promote further the 
co-ordination of policies through indicator-based surveillance.  The EMS intervention and 
credit  mechanisms  were  refined  to  take  account  of  the  different  scale  of  capital 
movements, the increased usc of intramarginal interventions and of the restraint shown 
by  Member States in  the me of credit facilities.  A  monitoring process was agreed  to en-
courage  the  combined  usc  of  concerted  interest  rate  changes,  interventions  and 
movements within the Ouctuation band in managing the system. 
The first revision of the ecu basket took place in  September 1984 without disturbance to 
the private ecu  markets.  The  rapid  development of the private  usc  of the ecu  by  the 
financial  sector continued during  1984  and 1985,  though its  growth tailed-off somewhat 
during 1986 and early  1987.  By  the summer of 1987  the ecu was treated throughout the 
Community as foreign currency. 
- 1987 onwards. 
The  "BaslefNyborg"  agreement  marked  the  beginning  of a  new  phase  for  the  EMS. 
Although the experience acquired in managing the system since September 1987 has been 
short, it has been relatively varied concerning external factors, such as the dollar, the yen 
and the G7 accord.  It is therefore possible to draw preliminary conclusions which suggest 
that the "BaslefNyborg" agreement has proved extremely beneficial to the functioning of 
the system.  Interest rate differentials have become the main weapon to combat tensions 
in  the parity grid.  The appropriate width of these dHfercntials has been reached at times 
by  way  of changes  in  the  levels  of interest  rates  in  both  strong  and  weak  currency 
countries without endangering anti-inflation strategies. This more balanced and more ef-
ficient management of the system, has increased confidence in  the stability of the parity 
grid.  Also, the understandings to keep realignments small, should they occur, as well  as 
to  allow  currencies  to  fluctuate  within  the  exchange  rate  band,  have  discouraged 
speculative  capital  movements.  As  a  result,  with  the  good,  but  by  no  means  perfect 
convergence  of economic  performances  being  maintained,  there  has  been  no  EMS 
re_alignment since January 1987. 
By  the end of 1987 all  twelve  Member States were  participating in  the system of swaps 
used  to  create  official  ccus,  as  well  as  taking  part  in  the  surveillance  and  monitoring 
procedures.  The Bank  for  International Settlements and the Swiss  National Dank have 
been  accorded  the  status  of Other  llolder  of official  ccus.  In  contrast,  only  eight 
countries participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) ofthe EMS, as at the outset 
ten years ago. 
3 1\ctivity in  the ccu  markets has expanded fairly  rapidly again, especially during the last 
eighteen months, helped  by the stability of the EMS  and perhaps boosted by  the  1992 
process. The lJ K started in  October 19R8  a programme to issue ecu Treasury Dills  which 
has  considerably  improved  the  liquidity  of  short-term  ecu  markets.  The  I tali  an 
government's ccu-linked borrowings have also been expanded.  In addition to this more 
intensive  financial  usc  or  the  ccu,  there arc also  signs  that the ecu  is  beginning  to be 
increasingly used as a currency for international commercial transactions. 
3.  Lessons and Challenges 
Looking back over the last ten  years, the EMS has undoubtedly proved a great success, 
even if some of the far-reaching intentions have  not been  fulfilled.  It has exceeded the 
expectations of many. Rut the Community·is changing fast and presenting new challenges 
to  which  the  EMS  will  have  to  react.  Most  importantly,  the  1992  process  is  now 
irreversible and the full  liberalisation of capital movements will  come into effect in July 
1990 for  most member countries. The EMS will  have to meet new challenges as the large 
internal market develops. 
- The EMS as a factor of stability 
The EMS has succeeded in achieving its primary goal of creating a  zone of internal and 
external monetary stability, based around the exchange rate mechanism (ERM).  The first 
decade of the EMS has led  to a reduction in the variability of nominal and real exchange 
rates  among  ERM  currencies,  to  lower  levels  of innation  and  to  smaller  interest  rate 
di!Tcrentials.  The misalignments that have so  characterized the international monetary 
system during the 1980s  have been avoided in  the EMS.  Thus, most important from the 
point of view  of the  business  sector,  exchange  rates  have become more predictable in 
ERM countries. 
After  having  been  regarded  to  a  certain  extent  as  an  anomaly  in  the  international 
monetary system,  it is  now gratifying to  note that the  I M F  has carefully examined the 
System on a number of occasions. The question is  now raised as to the concrete implica-
tions the successful operation of  the EMS has for the design of  the international monetary 
system. 
Capital markets are becoming increasingly intcrdependant.  The full  liberalization of ca-
pital movements, which is due to take place hy l July 1990 for most ERM members, and 
the development of a common financial area in  the Community may pose new problems 
for the maintenance of  monetary stability.  Therefore, ever closer monetary co-operation 
4 in  the framework of the EMS will  be required if tensions arc to be avoided and properly 
managed, since it  is  evident that renewed  flexibility  of exchange rates will  endanger the 
functioning  of the internal  market.  At the same  time,  the  growing  interdependence of 
economies  in  the  run-up  to  1992  will  show  up  all  the  more  the  paradox  and  the 
inconveniences of the non-participation in the ERM of those currencies in a position to 
do so. 
- The· EMS as a factor for convergence 
The EMS has  play~d a vital role in  bringing monetary policies and performances closer 
together. Since the EMS is  first and foremost a monetary system, it is not surprising that 
its  success  is  concentrated in  the area of monetary convergence. On the policy side this 
is  reflected in the similarity of monetary targets and spread of market-based methods of 
monetary control.  The convergence of inflation rates at low levels shows how monetary 
performances have also  come together.  However,  if differences  in  other economic va-
riables  such  as  growth,  current accounts and budget balances are too great, monetary 
stability will  be endangered.  The EMS is  therefore becoming more and more the focus 
for  general  economic  policy  co-ordination.  One  example  of this  evolution  is  the 
indicator-based surveillance process agreed as part of the "Basle/Nyborg" package. Here 
the  exchange  rate  constraint  of the  EMS  is  used  as  the key  element  in  an emerging 
procedure designed  to  show up potential  incompa~ibilities or divergences  in  economic 
policies using a set of indicators  ~angihg from _gro~h to current account balances, and 
from  budget  positions  to  inflation  rates,  bpth in  a  short-term  and  in  a  medium-term 
framework. 
Budget policies are perhaps the area in which  the greatest policy divergences remain in 
EMS  countries.  The  financing  of budget  deficits,  however,  appears  to  have  been 
undertaken much less  by  monetary means in  recent years,  a  development in  which the 
EMS constraint has no doubt played a key role.  Also the pressure for the budget policies 
of EMS members to converge has increased substantially, as recognition has grown that 
the large differences persisting pose a threat to the stability of the EMS parity grid. 
Current account imbalances too remain very  different between EMS countries. The use 
of nominal exchange rate stability within the EMS as a constraint may have contributed 
somewhat in certain cases to the relative payments imbalances that have appeared.  But 
the source of these imbalances is  basically structural in nature and correction will require 
action on that side.  As long as offsetting capital flows continue to take place smoothly, 
the EMS should be able to cope with these persisting imbalances. 
5 The  success  of the  large  internal  market,  to  be  completed  by  1'992,  requires  closer 
economic and monetary co-operation, for which there is plenty of  scope for improvement. 
The  national  economies  of the  Community  countries  will  become  integrated  to  a 
significantly  greater degree.  Any inconsistencies  in  policies will  therefore cause all  the 
more  disturbance  to  economic  activity.  The  EMS  is  already  at  the  centre  of the 
Community's convergence efforts.  As recognized explicitly in the Single European Act, 
experience with the EMS should be used in reOections on the further development of the 
Community.  A  strengthened EMS itself will  undoubtedly have an important role to play 
in  the  actions  concerning  economic  convergence  that  we  shall  find  necessary  for  the 
smooth functioning of the large internal market. 
As long as the present progress on convergence is  kept up, it is  natural that it should be 
reOected in the way in which the EMS functions.  Gradually, as more, and more countries 
approach  the inflation  rate of the best performer,  the  procedu~es by which the system 
promotes and manages convergence wilt need to become more qalanced. On the one hand 
this may appear to complicate matters both within the EMS an? with· third countries, but, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  EMS  wilt  be  more  solid  as  a  result;  given  the  increased 
commitment that will he behind it. This can only be an advantage for efforts to create a 
zone of monetary stability in Europe. It will  also add to the force  of Europe's voice on 
the world monetary scene. 
-The ecu 
The ecu has progressed enormously over the last ten years. It  "has ·become a major inter-
national financial instrument, overtaking most of its component currencies in its interna-
tional financial  use,  though it now only  occupies sixth  place in the euromarkets.  The 
ecu's role in international commercial transactions is  only just beginning.  If it is  to play 
the useful  role of increasing transparency in the large  internal  market of 1992,  various 
impediments  to  the  ecu's  development  should  be  dismantled  and  its  commercial  usc 
encouraged.  The ecu  should remain a constant reminder to policy-makers of Europe's 
potential monetary identity. 
The rapid development of the private ecu contrasts with the lack of  progress of  the official 
ecu towards the role of a  true reserve asset. Indeed it is  the private ecu which at present 
better fulfils  that role.  The reasons  for  the  official  ecu's  slow  progress  are manifold, 
rooted in the delicate balance between the availability of credit facilities and the pressure 
for  internal adjustment in  the EMS.  The official ecu creation mechanism encourages it 
to be treated as additional liquidity, potentially affecting all component currencies, backed 
by  gold and doHar reserves.  The temporary nature of the official ecu ano ii.s  i.reatment 
6 more as a credit facility than as a reserve asset are factors holding back its development. 
Until these drawbacks are rectified, which would add to the financial fabric of the EMS, 
the official ecu will not be much more than an accounting unit. 
4. Conclusion 
The success of the EMS  over its ten years of existence should not be allowed to lead to 
complacency.  The. :world, is  changing,  developments  are  moving  particularly fast  in the 
Community itself.  The evolutionary character and the adaptability of the EMS, which 
ha-ve- been essential to !ts success, must continue. The challenges facing  the Community 
require more efficient and more intense monetary co-operation. The EMS is  the core of 
efforts in'· this field.- The experience gained· with the EMS and the ecu should be used in 
or:der to make .the· large internal rnar.ket. funiti~m  more efficiently and increase the welfare 
of the-citizens· of the Community. 
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